Ramachandra*
* Assistant Professor, Department of political Science, Government First grade College, Hosadurga, Chitradurga, Karnataka.
Abstract
The recent elections held in Karnataka were significant for a number of reasons, many of which were discussed threadbare in the popular press at different levels. The BJP victory was astounding. Veterans politicians like Mallikarjun Kharge, who never lost an election or those like Deva Gowda and Veerappa Moily, all of them lost by huge margins. A more exhaustive analysis tends to happens only as a post-factor event – something which is bound to happen even this time. The verdict has confounded many observers who were looking at the larger picture. Hence, there is often an attempt to simplify what is otherwise a complex and perplexing result. There is no doubt that factors like nationalism, terrorism and related aspects did play an important part in the outcome, it would be unfair to ascribe the results only to one or two factors. Using the prism of an analysis of the results in Karnataka we argue that the verdict is the result of more complex factors that are at work in the state.
Keywords: Astounding, Exhaustive Analysis, verdict, Political Land Scape, Discernible, NOTA, Criss-crossed, Coalition government.
Introduction
The recently concluded elections were significant for a number of reasons, many of which were discussed threadbare in the popular press at different levels. The scale of BJP victory in Karnataka is, to say the least, astounding. Veterans like Mallikarjun Kharge, who never lost an election or those like Deva Gowda and Veerappa Moily, who had bucked the 2014 Modi wave lost. And, all of them lost by large margins. A more exhaustive analysis tends to happens only as a post-factor event – something which is bound to happen even this time. The verdict has confounded many observers who were looking at the larger picture. Hence, there is often an attempt to simplify what is otherwise a complex and perplexing result. There is no doubt that factors like nationalism, terrorism and related aspects did play an important part in the outcome, it would be unfair to ascribe the results only to one or two factors. Using the prism of an analysis of the results in Karnataka we argue that the verdict is the result of more complex factors that are at work in the state.
Karnataka Verdict: Overview
Karnataka has 28 parliamentary seats of which four are reserved for Scheduled Castes while 24 are unreserved. The political landscape of Karnataka is diverse and difficult to predict. The diversity is largely because of its historical evolution where the state consists of parts of that were united into a linguistic state from the British India and various princely states. There are six regions in the state each with its own unique set of political, social and economic dynamics. These regions include Bengaluru (28 assembly seats), Old Mysore (61 assembly seats; part of the princely state of Mysore), Coastal Karnataka (19 assembly seats), Central Karnataka (26 assembly seats), Hyderabad Karnataka (40 seats; part of erstwhile princely state of Hyderabad), and Bombay Karnataka (50 seats; part of the Bombay Presidency). According to the 2011 Census1, Hindus comprise of about 84 per cent of the population, Muslims about 13 per cent and Christians 1.87 per cent. An interesting aspect of Karnataka is the historical importance of various sects within Hinduism — a factor which played an important role in 2018 Assembly elections. Dalits make up about 17 per cent of the population. Unofficial estimates indicate that the two politically “dominant communities”[1], Lingayats and Vokkaligas make up an estimated 16-17 and 11-13 per cent respectively. Historically, Lingayats and Vokkaligas dominate the political landscape and have always accounted for about fifty percent of the elected legislators and parliamentarians.
In Karnataka there are three major political parties – Indian National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Janata Dal (Secular) – of which two occupy the most important part of the spectrum while the third is a relatively smaller party, whose importance was magnified in the 2018 Assembly elections. It is well known fact that smaller parties tend to play a crucial role when there is an indecisive verdict.
Table 1: Karnataka General Elections
| Parties | 2014 | 2019 | ||
| Seats | Vote Share | Seats | Vote share | |
| BJP | 17 | 43.37 | 25 | 51.38 |
| Congress | 9 | 41.15 | 1 | 31.88 |
| Janata Dal (S) | 9 | 11.07 | 1 | 9.67 |
| Others parties | 0 | 1.24 | 0 | 1.31 |
| Independents | 0 | 1.57 | 1 | 5.04 |
| NOTA | 0 | 0.83 | 0 | 0.71 |
Note: Vote Share in Percentage
Source: Compiled From Election Commission of India website (https://eci.gov.in/statistical-reDOrt/statisticah reports/ and http://results.eci.gov.in/pc/en/trends/statewiseS101.htm?st=S 101
The verdict in Karnataka threw up new and interesting aspects and aspects. It is not clear whether these will continue to remain long lasting trends. The contest was primarily between the BJP and the Congress-JDS alliance on the other hand. The discernible trends in 2019 elections include: first, the voter turnout was a record of 68.6 per cent which was higher than the previous highest 67.58 per cent recorded in 1999 parliamentary elections and about 67.2 per cent recorded in the 2014 general elections[2]. Second, the verdict illustrated that it was overwhelming win for the BJP. The party won 25 out of 28 (or about 89 per cent) of the parliamentary seats in the state. A victory of this magnitude is rare in Karnataka. Second, the BJP won more than half of the popular vote share: it garnered 51.38 per cent of the votes cast.
Third, the magnitude of the vielory of the BJP in 2019 was larger than 2014 in terms of seat and vote sliare – trend that is in consonance with many other states in the country. Our observation about the magnitude of the victory is borne out by the results: in 20 of28 seats at stake, the BJP won by a margin of more than 1 lakh votes while in 24 of the total 28 seats the BJP won by a margin of more than 50,000 votes. In most constituencies, the swing in favour of the BJP varied from 6 to 12 percent of the votes cast. Fourth, except in one constituency (Mandya), won by an independent supported by the BJP, in all the other constituencies all candidates not belonging to the tluee major political parties lost their deposits. Fifth, in some constituencies “none of the above” (or NOTA) garnered the third highest number of votes polled, indicating of the complete dominance of the three political parties in the state. Sixth, the verdict saw the complete defeat of the Deva Gowda family, which has played an. important part in the state’s politics over the past three decades. Seventh, 2019 witnessed a marginal decline in the share of NOTA.
Assembly versus Parliament Voting Patterns
Karnataka has 224 assembly seats. Table 2 offers insights into the seat and vote shares of different parties in the two assembly elections (2013 and 2018). In 2013, BJP the then incumbent was defeated after it was bruised by a combination of anti-incumbency and a division of its votes due to the split in the party with a section led by B.S. Yedyurappa floating a separate party. Though the Congress won in the 2013 Assembly elections, it had to be content with just nine seats in the parliamentary elections while the BJP won 17 of the total 28 seats. This victory was largely facilitated by the Modi wave in 2014 and the fact that Yeddyurappa had returned to the parent party shortly before the 2014 general elections.
Table 2: Karnataka Assembly Elections
| Parties | 20 | 13 | 2018 | |
| Seats | Vote Share | Seats | Vote share | |
| BJP | 40 | 19.89 | 104 | 36.22 |
| Congress | 122 | 36.59 | 78 | 38.04 |
| Janata dal (S) | 40 | 20.19 | 37 | 20.61 |
| Others | 13 | 15.95 | 2 | 2.34 |
| Independents | 9 | 7.38 | 1 | 3.93 |
| NOTA | NA | NA | 0 | 0.86 |
Note: Vote Share in Percentage; * NOTA was introduced for the first time in the elections to Assemblies of Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and MP in December 2013.
Compiled from Election Commission oflndia Website (https://eci ■ gov.i n/stati stical-report/stati sti cal-reports/)
In 2018 elections, the BJP emerged as the single largest party with 105 seats against the Congress’ tally of 78 seats. This is despite the fact that the Congress got a number of votes. Interestingly, the vote and seat share of the JDS remained largely constant. After high drama which saw a midnight Supreme Court hearing, the Congress and JDS formed a coalition government in which the representative of the third largest party ended up as the Chief Minister.
Understanding the Electoral Tsunami
An important aspect of the elections is that the ruling coalition which was cobbled up after the elections in May 2018 or about one year before the general elections was decimated. The results indicate that Karnataka has now emerged as the stronghold which the BJP can use as the springboard for its larger foray into other South Indian states much like Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are to North and Central India. If one were extrapolate the parliamentary elections to the legislative assembly, the BJP would have won about 170 seats while the ruling alliance would have won in about 50 seats. There are a number of reasons for this. A combination of Karnataka specific factors and national level factors played an important role. First, Karnataka has a history of voting different for parliament and assembly elections. Second, the ruling alliance has only itself to blame. They were essentially stuck with fighting among themselves rather than putting up a resolute fight against a common foe – something that had enabled them to come to power in the first place. In short, the government has survived on a tenterhook from the very first day. They have been afflicted by constant dissidence and infighting either among the partners or have had to keep unhappy members in good humour. The net results are that governance went for a toss – a factor that had a significant impact on an electorate that votes differently in assembly and parliament elections. Third, BJP’s mammoth victory was made possible only because it was able to make dramatic gains into the Congress Vote bank in Old Mysuru Region – another first to the BJP’s credit. That is indicative of not just dissatisfaction but the fact that the BJP got the caste arithmetic right. In contrast, the alliance’s tendency to focus on giving tickets to members of entrenched families was contrasted with those of the BJP which went out of the way to show that it was against dynastic politics – an optics that meant the denial of ticket to the wife of the Union Minister, Late Ananth Kumar. Contrast this with the JDS where in two constituencies their third-generation family members contested – something that left an acute distaste among the electorate. In a number of seats it may be noted that poor strategy and execution led to self in (lie ted wounds among the alliance partners. Foremost is the fact thai the alliance partners never really worked in earnest for each other. The ease of Tumkur where the .IDS was allotted the ticket in the face of vociferous opposition from the sitting MP was illustrative of this. Moreover, fight for tickets often took a nasty turn where the partners did not work the success of each other. In many cases, the distribution of tickets was such that it was not just the victory but the margin of victory was assured. This poor strategy went to extreme lengths. In two constituencies that were allotted to JDS, that party did not have candidates and instead had to borrow candidates from the Congress. Thus, it is clear that better strategy would have invariably led to better electoral results for the alliance partners.
The role and contribution of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, his ability to micro-manage the party affairs and marshal the cumulative resources of the party without any let up played an important role. Unlike the alliance partners, whose electoral fight did not gain traction till the last minute, the Prime Minister and Amit Shah, the BJP president not just criss-crossed the state but saw to it that all the groups in the party worked to a united goal – that of victory. Similarly, the reach of the BJP and its affiliates in the ‘Sangh Parivar’ meant that while the BJP’s campaign was visible, the door-to-door low profile but highly effective campaign of hundreds of thousands of ideologically motivated cadres created a ground for the electoral tsunami. This explains the loss of entrenched leaders even in their strong holds. This cohesion and single minded devotion to achieving the goal was contrasted with that of the alliance partners where fights over ticket distribution meant that a large segment of the focal leadership was unhappy or a last minute stitching up a comprise meant a classic case of ‘too little, too late’.
The creation of the BJP juggernaut is largely due a major change in the electoral strategy of the BJP under Modi-Shah. Unlike in the past, the BJP has no qualms about assimilating strong candidates with a mass base into itself. In the past, this tactical move was considered the forte of the Congress Party and the BJP subtly frowned presumably because the ideological difference that may have been thought to exist. Post 2014, it is clear that the BJP under the leadership of Modi-Shah have no such qualms. They have been liberal in seeking to win over any discontented elements in any party across the ideological spectrum. In fact, the BJP’s success in Gulbarga and Bidar is because it was played a proactive role in drawing such elements in these seats – both of which the BJP won.
It is in this context of well oiled paily machinery backed by huge human resources and razor sharp focussed strategy that the post-Pulwama nationalist rhetoric should be approached. A nationalist rhetoric was something that was always a part of the BJP arsenal but the fact that it could be harnessed was lai’gely due to the fact that the party organisation was able to exploit it to the fullest extent which made the difference. Of course, to all the above one may add the usual factors like money power, advertising power and more importantly social media. The spread of smart phones and mobile internet means that the role of media transmission and their impact has changed. Millions of mobile internet connections aided by massive numbers of social media organisation and groups pushing Modi’s re-election bid, it is but not surprising that his message reached the last mile. In Karnataka elections social media reach and social media campaign, especially in the aftermath of Pulwama and surgical strikes played an important part in mobilising public opinion in favour of Narendra Modi. The use of social media to fill the gap in the last mile media outreach is a new feature of 2019 elections and one that will continue to remain for the foreseeable future.
An aspect of 2019 elections is that it is clear that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has brought about a major shift in the manner in which future elections will be fought. It was different for the simple reason that it was for the first time that an election was fought with all the new dynamics and one in which a national party was able to truly change the narrative from one that is usually highly localised to one that was pan-India in scope.
There is no doubt that the biggest win in Karnataka’s parliamentary election voting patterns will have massive ramifications – one that is already playing. The writing on the wall is clear that the opportunistic alliance’s days are likely to be numbered. This is for the reason that the alliance was afflicted by contradictions from day one and they had no unifying factor other than keeping the BJP out of power. A more worrying factor for the non-BJP parties should be the fact that it is clear that the BJP has spread its wings to areas that were in the past considered to be the traditional strong holds of the opposition. Hence, it is likely that the politics ot the state is likely to be in a state of flux for the next few years.
References
Kothari. Raj ini and Manor. James (eds). Caste in Indian Politics. Orient Blackswan. Hyderabad
2010
hup: www.censusindia.yov.in 2011 census Religion PCA. tiinil
https://eci.gov.in statistical-report statistical-reports
[1] Used in the same sense as Rajini Kothari and James Manor (eds), Caste in Indian Politics, Orient Blackswan, Hyderabad, 2010
[2] htti^:”eci.gov.in/statistica1-reDort/statistical-reports/ (website last visited 15 July 2019)
Track2Training 